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FOREWORD
At the time of this writing, the events during the
2016 presidential election campaign have focused intense attention on the dangers of hostile cyber and information operations by foreign powers. The legality
under international law of this kind of interference in
another state’s information space has been the subject
of long discussion, both bilaterally between the United
States and other major cyber powers, and internationally at the United Nations (UN) and elsewhere.
In this Letort Paper, completed in late 2015, British
researcher Keir Giles provides a guide to the various
and conflicting trends in this debate. As a long-term
scholar of the Russian approach to cyber policy and
legality in cyberspace, Giles places the discussion, and
U.S. concerns, in an international context. In particular,
he explains the deep ideological divides on the correct
course of action to take between the United States and
its allies on the one hand, and a large group of nations
led by Russia and China on the other.
Mr. Giles’s previous work has highlighted the
broad interpretation and application of “cyber power” by adversarial actors, including the potential for a
range of hostile information activities that the United
States would classify in entirely different domains.
With this in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute recommends this Letort Paper not only to policymakers
and researchers focusing on law and policy in the cyber field, but also more broadly to those engaged in
protecting the United States against other forms of information operations including subversion, destabilization, and disinformation. As is shown in this Letort
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Paper, legislative initiatives by potential adversaries
provide important insights into the conceptual framework within which they consider and plan unfriendly
actions.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
This Letort Paper provides an overview of moves
toward establishing international norms and the rule
of law in cyberspace, and the potential for establishing
further internationally accepted and enforceable standards of behavior. Completed in late 2015, it reflects
the state of play in these areas at that time. It especially
highlights opposing views on the nature of legality in
cyberspace, and how and where those views are gaining global support.
The United States believes, in broad terms, that activities in cyberspace require no new legislation, and
that existing legal obligations are sufficient. However,
a large number of other states led by Russia and China believe that new international legal instruments
are essential in order to govern information security
overall, including as expressed through the evolving
domain of cyberspace. Russia in particular argues that
the challenges presented by cyberspace are too urgent
to wait for customary law to develop as it has done in
other domains; instead, urgent action is needed.
As well as disagreement on new legislation, there
is a fundamental schism in international discussion
on what exactly should constitute illegal behavior in
cyberspace. Russian and Chinese information security policies express a holistic approach to countering information threats, particularly by recognizing
the problem of harmful content, as well as the strict
“cyber” issue of harmful code or “cyber weapons.”
Nevertheless, the previous basic Euro-Atlantic assumption that freedom of expression and free movement of information online are sacrosanct has now
been challenged in some quarters, in the face of their
exploitation by Russia and the Islamic State (IS). Hos-
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tile information activities by both actors have brought
clarity to the concerns over subversive content that
were previously expressed by Russia and China but
disavowed by the United States.
Another keystone element of the ongoing legal debate is whether, when, and to what extent the Law Of
Armed Conflict (LOAC) can apply to hostile actions
carried out through cyberspace, and hence the subtopic of what precisely constitutes an “armed attack”
online. This Letort Paper provides an overview of the
current state of the debate and progress toward international agreement, including a discussion of the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber
Warfare, and its merits and limitations.
Further sections of this Letort Paper discuss existing rules and agreements governing cyber activity,
including attempts to control cyber weapons by the
Wassenaar Arrangements—an international regime
regulating exports of conventional weapons and
sensitive dual-use items and technologies with military end-uses—and the development of a range of
international confidence building measures (CBMs)
in various international organizations, including the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), the Organization of American States (OAS),
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and
more. Besides CBMs, several other codes of norms
and good behavior have been constructed in regional agreements and are reviewed here, including the
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (the
Budapest Convention). A further section discusses
bilateral agreements and treaties, including those between the United States and Russia, and the United
States and China.
This Letort Paper concludes with policy recommendations, including the key conclusion that adverxiv

saries are framing their cyber offensive potential in
an entirely different mental construct than that which
applies in the United States and its Western allies.
The approaches of key potential state adversaries to
legitimation or prohibition of online activity provides
important clues to how they see this activity in terms
of their own behaviors. As such, they provide a useful
aid in planning for, countering, and responding to the
wide range of threats to U.S. security that state and
nonstate adversaries can present using the Internet.
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PROSPECTS FOR THE RULE
OF LAW IN CYBERSPACE
INTRODUCTION
The application of international law and legal
principles in cyberspace is a topic that has caused confusion, doubt, and interminable discussions between
lawyers since the earliest days of the internationalization of the Internet. The still unresolved debate over
whether cyberspace constitutes a fundamentally new
domain that requires fundamentally new laws to govern it reveals basic ideological divides. On the one
hand, the Euro-Atlantic community led by the United
States believes, in broad terms, that activities in cyberspace require no new legislation, and existing legal
obligations are sufficient. On the other, a large number of other states led by Russia and China believe that
new international legal instruments are essential in
order to govern information security overall, including those expressed through the evolving domain of
cyberspace.1
Analogies for the current state of regulation in
cyberspace are commonplace. The domain has been
compared to the early days of highway regulations,
or to maritime law. In each of these cases, the norms
that were based on trust were eventually formed into
customs, and were finally codified as law. Russia in
particular argues that the challenges presented by
cyberspace are too urgent to wait for customary law
to develop as it has done in other domains; instead,
urgent action is needed.
The following Letort Paper will provide an overview of moves toward establishing norms and the rule
of law in cyberspace, and the potential for establishing
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further international norms of behavior. It will also
highlight opposing views on the nature of legality in
cyberspace; and how and where those views are gaining global support.
It will be shown that despite persistent and longterm campaigning by a number of states for new
binding international agreements, at present the most
successful initiatives are primarily establishing norms
on proper behavior through commercial interaction,
and building confidence through bilateral confidence
building agreements.
TO LEGISLATE, OR NOT TO LEGISLATE
Russian senior officers agree with Admiral Michael Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency
(NSA) and head of U.S. Cyber Command, that deterrence in cyberspace faces serious challenges,2 and that
analogies with nuclear deterrence are flawed. However, unsurprisingly, they disagree with his proposed
remedy of enhancing deterrence by increasing the
United States’ offensive capabilities. With escalation
of cyber conflict likely, proliferation easy, and public
attribution challenging, one Russian proposal is for
a binding international agreement under the aegis of
the United Nations (UN) that bans hostile actions in
cyberspace altogether.3
This reflects a fundamental Russian objection to the
concept of international law already applying to cyber
conflict: the argument that the militarization of information space and cyber conflict should be prevented
outright, rather than regulated. At the same time,
Russia has also persistently proposed that technical
means be developed for the recognition of facilities
in cyberspace that are protected under international
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humanitarian law, such as hospitals and medical facilities. Proposals range from simple top-level domains
that are designated as protected, to an industry-wide
set of recognized domain extensions for protective
marking of validated resources, or even a simple register of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.
In this case and others, close examination of Russian proposals often swiftly uncovers points that render them either unworkable in practice, or unacceptable to Western sensitivities.4 Foremost among these
is the assertion by Russia, China, and a wide range of
other nations that content must be regulated, in addition to code.
HARMFUL CODE OR HARMFUL CONTENT
As well as disagreement on the need, or lack of
a need, for new legislation, there is a fundamental
schism in international discussion on what exactly
ought to constitute illegal behavior in cyberspace.
Russian and Chinese information security policies
express a holistic approach to countering information
threats, particularly by recognizing the problem of
harmful content as well as the strict “cyber” issue of
harmful code.
Until very recently, Western theorists and policymakers on cyber issues were, by contrast, broadly unreceptive to the notion of harmful content. The notion
that free expression of opinion constitutes a danger
was seen as something wild and exotic, and rejected a
priori, while freedom of expression and free movement
of information across borders was held as sacrosanct.
This schism became clear at the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT)
in Dubai in December 2012. In the wake of the Arab
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Spring, the Internet was perceived by Russia as a
threat to domestic peace and power structures, upon
which Russia actively promoted international norms
to guide states’ behavior in cyberspace; a call that
stems from the notion that the virtual borders in cyberspace can correspond with physical state borders,
thereby reaffirming the principles of sovereignty and
non-intervention.5 Russia went to WCIT with such a
security-driven Internet governance agenda, proposing a state-supervised Internet.
The extent of support for the viewpoint championed by Russia from those countries that share similar
concerns about the cyberthreat took the Euro-Atlantic
consensus by surprise. Although Russian initiatives
have been mostly discounted or ignored in the West,
this is not their only audience, and Russia has been
busy gathering support from countries not usually
considered cyber powers, but that have a perfectly
valid vote in fora such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) or the UN itself. This is possible because, while many of the proposals appear
counter-intuitive, outdated, unworkable or otherwise
unacceptable to a Western audience, they appear comforting and reasonable in those other parts of the world
that see a potential threat in the unrestricted circulation of information, including hostile and damaging
information, both domestically and internationally.
When Giuseppe Abbamonte of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Communications
Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT)
stated publicly that a key part of European Union
(EU) cybersecurity strategy is: “engaging with third
parties and making sure that we export our values
[emphasis added],” many of those hearing him would
not have taken into account that there are substan-
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tial parts of the world that do not wish to have their
values exported to them from Brussels6—and in fact,
precisely this kind of export is construed as a direct
information security threat in Russia’s Information
Security Doctrine.7
UKRAINE AND ISLAMIC STATE (IS)
The basic U.S. and Western assumption that freedom of expression and free movement of information
online are untouchable has now been questioned, in
the face of two distinct challenges to Western societies:
Russian information war activities centered around
the conflict in Ukraine; and the Islamic State (IS), with
its own specific aims.
In both cases, a key element of the challenge is
subversive disinformation and propaganda produced
by “a multi-tiered online media operation in which a
number of production units . . . produce content consistent with the core . . . message.”8 The result of both
is that, for the first time in generations, the West has
been forced to reconsider the application of the liberal principles of freedom of expression in a practical
applied context—not on the basis of idealism, but in
dealing with a problem that is real and immediate.
In the case of Russia, cyber activities in the broad
sense are critical to offensive disinformation campaigns, whether establishing sources for disinformation by setting up false media outlets online,9 or using social media to address targets of opportunity
for subversion and destabilization efforts apparently
unrelated to events in Ukraine.10 These activities are
augmented by the ubiquitous activities of trolls and
bots that exploit specific features of the relationship
between traditional and social media in order to both
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plant, disseminate, and lend credibility to disinformation.11 They combine for effect with a broad range of
other measures, such as Russian propaganda outlets
being coy about their affiliation in order to seduce
viewers in the United States and elsewhere,12 links
with far-right political parties to garner direct political influence,13 and old-school subversive measures
such as: “NGO [nongovernmental organization] diplomacy, or establishing and assisting pro-Russian
youth groups, minority and separatist organizations,
and think tanks abroad.”14 The result is that externally,
the multiplicity of deceptive narratives put forward
by Russian information campaigns find fertile ground
among populations that are not well informed on the
realities of history, geography, and the issues at stake
in Ukraine.
IS’s active social media presence has prompted
private companies like Twitter to take down social
media accounts and block hashtags. These moves
have received broad popular support, but have also
been criticized by online freedom advocacy groups
such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Twitter
and similar corporations are accused of opacity on
their policy of taking terrorist content offline, including the reporting threshold for triggering removal,
and whether they themselves are actively searching
for terrorist accounts—and if so, according to what
criteria.15 Facebook is criticized for not publicly releasing data on U.S. Government censorship requests.16
This debate continues. In March 2015, senior members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee sent a
bipartisan letter to Twitter urging them to increase
efforts to combat groups like the IS. “Companies
need to ensure that their social media services are
not being hijacked for terrorist use [emphasis add-
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ed].”17 The request was met with understanding, but
was also countered with the argument they wish to
preserve: “the ability of users to share freely their
views—including views that many people may disagree with or find abhorrent [emphasis added].”18 As
an international company, Twitter must necessarily
deal with the implication that complying with one
government’s request to censor all pro-IS users could
lend support to another, less liberal government’s
requests to censor all anti-government users.
In an example of a de facto norm being outsourced
to the private sector—since the U.S. Government and
other countries have, in effect, delegated the task—corporations have developed their own codes of conduct
for the content they will agree to host, to remove, and
for their capabilities to censor objectionable content.19
Although it has recently come to prominence, this is
not a new phenomenon. It echoes early debates from
the 1990s onward concerning where responsibility
lies for the availability of illegal content found online:
with the user, the service provider, or the state.
However, the result is that different private actors, applying different codes and standards, engaging in private forms of censorship on their own behalf
have generated confusion and shown inconsistency.
Google’s policy directors are opposed to blanket censoring of IS content on its search engine and video platform YouTube, despite a stated desire not to become
the distribution channel of terrorist ideology. Google
states: “Enforced silence is not the answer. Drowning out the harmful ideology with better messages,
with reasonable messages, is the better way [emphasis added].”20 This too reflects a broader debate: some
proponents of censorship have suggested a holistic
government-initiated counterinsurgency tactic online,
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by increasing censorship and marginalizing IS;21 while
others have suggested copying Chinese and Russian
propaganda tactics, by saturating the web with counter narratives, and drowning IS propaganda in a sea of
fake propaganda.22 Neither approach would have appeared acceptable just a few years previously, before
the threat of deliberate harmful content distribution
became undeniable.
David Fidler, senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, has proposed solutions that involve
transparent cooperation of the U.S. Government with
private companies. He suggests that the U.S. Government should publicly issue a presidential directive setting out the circumstances under which it will request
that private companies take down content. He also
pushes for private companies to explain their policies
and subject them to review by independent experts,
and for the government’s Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board to oversee government requests and
report on them to Congress and the public.23
While the idea of harmful content, in the way Russia and China perceive it, is no longer outrageously
unacceptable, the balance is yet to be found between
developing an effective domestic counter-subversion
strategy while not setting a dangerous precedent of
censoring content online. If mishandled, the response
to online subversion by IS and Russia could provide
the means for abuse within the United States as well
as other countries, to censor not just terrorist content
but also dissenting opinions in the manner of authoritarian states that use an “extremist” label to censor
anti-government social media accounts.
Despite the clear and growing evidence of challenges in this field, it can be assumed that the United
States will not wish to follow the Chinese and Russian
lead on restrictions of civil liberties.
8

The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).
A keystone element of the ongoing legal debates
revolves around whether, when, and to what extent
LOAC can apply to hostile actions carried out through
cyberspace, and hence the sub-topic of what precisely
constitutes an “armed attack” online. A wealth of informed legal commentary on this topic is available,
and this Letort Paper will not replicate it. Instead, it
will provide an overview of the current state of the
debate and progress toward international agreement.
UNITED NATIONS GROUP OF
GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS (UNGGE)
The UNGGE on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of
International Security is the only UN platform where
state behavior in cyberspace is discussed. The group
was also named tactically, to avoid discussion on information security versus cybersecurity. This was an
essential step, since some states deliberately avoid any
use of the term “information security” in official statements because of its negative associations. Even if the
phrase is the most appropriate one to describe the
topic under discussion, it has been sufficiently tainted
by association with the regulatory stance adopted by
Russia and China in particular, that it is shunned in
favor of the more acceptable “cybersecurity.”24
The proposal to establish the group came from
Russia in 2003, with a remit to “study existing concepts and approaches and analyze current international legal provisions relating to various aspects of
international information security.”25 Since then, the
group has produced three consensus reports and con-
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vened again in 2016. After years of stalemate, the 2013
report appeared to be a breakthrough, affirming a
consensus that:
International law, and in particular the UN Charter, is
applicable, and is essential to maintaining peace and
stability and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and
accessible ICT [information and communications technology] environment.26

How exactly the law applied and when, however,
remained unspecified, and was the subject of further
debate.
The 2015 report thus went deeper into the application of international law. It did, however, exclude the
milestone from the previous report: that the UN Charter in its entirety applies in cyberspace. Specifically,
the authorization of the use of force in self-defense
against an “armed attack,” as described by Article 51
of the UN Charter, was revoked.27 According to James
Lewis, the group’s rapporteur and director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Strategic
Technologies Program, the proposal was rejected by
a bloc of nations, including Russia, China, Pakistan,
Malaysia, and Belarus. The Chinese argument was apparently that they did not want to include reference to
Article 51, because this would militarize cyberspace.
According to Lewis, there was also an unspoken concern that the United States would use Article 51 to
legitimize offensive counteraction for major breaches
attributed to Chinese and Russian hackers.28
Accepting the applicability of LOAC, some states
fear, will set the circumstances in which a state is justified in invoking its right to self-defense. However, it
also risks encouraging the perception that all activity
not expressly prohibited would be acceptable.29
10

On the application of international law, the 2015
UNGGE report outlines which of the principles of the
UN charter and international law do apply to the use
of ICTs:
• State sovereignty, jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within their territory, and sovereign
equality;
• Settlement of international disputes with peaceful means;
• Refraining from threat or use of force;
• Respect for human rights and fundamental
freedom;
• Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other
states;
• States must not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts using ICTs, and should
seek to ensure that their territory is not used by
nonstate actors to commit such acts;
• States must take responsibility for internationally wrongful acts attributable to them under
international law. The indication that an ICT
activity was launched or otherwise originates
from the territory or the ICT infrastructure of
a state may be insufficient to attribute activity;
and,
• International legal principles of humanity,
necessity, proportionality, and distinction are
applicable to the use of ICTs.
The UNGGE did also identify voluntary, non-binding
norms for responsible state behavior, to create an international code of conduct for information security:
• States should cooperate to increase stability
and security in the use of ICTs and prevent ICT
practices that are known to be harmful. They
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•
•
•

•
•
•
•

should create a global culture of cybersecurity
to protect critical information infrastructures
(capacity building);
States should not conduct, or support ICT activity that intentionally damages critical infrastructure;
States should not allow their territory to be
used for, or support internationally wrongful
acts using ICTs;
States should cooperate to exchange information, assist each other, prosecute terrorist and
criminal use of ICTs and implement other cooperative measures to address such threats;
States should respect human rights on the Internet, and the right to privacy in the digital age,
including the right to freedom of expression;
States should ensure the integrity of the supply
chain so that end users can have confidence in
the security of ICT products;
States should seek to prevent the proliferation
of malicious ICT tools; and,
States should encourage responsible reporting
of ICT vulnerabilities.

The power of the group and of these consensus
reports is limited. Many of the delegate experts are
not authorized to make national statements on behalf
of their countries, and the reports have the status of
non-binding recommendations. The UNGGE advises
states to give active consideration to these recommendations, and to take them up for further development
and implementation.
The 2013 report was subjected to a vote at the UN
General Assembly, but the consensus required to
adopt the report as a resolution was not reached. Little
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further progress was made in the 2015 report, most
likely because not all the countries with strong interests in the regulation of cyberspace were involved in
the drafting of the report. States like India had already
expressed their discontent with the report before it
came out, since it was not allowed to contribute an
expert for the group. This was a simple administrative
decision rather than deliberate exclusion; India was
too late responding to the call for nominations, as the
group is composed on a first come, first served basis.
The 2015 report was drafted by 20 experts, five
more than the 15 experts that participated in the 2013
report. While expanded, the group still is very small in
size. This limited participation presents both a weakness and a strength of the UNGGE. The small membership allows the group to come to a consensus quickly.
The participation of the powers wielding a veto in
the UN Security Council, and an equal geographical
distribution of participating countries, gives the consensus significance since it unites important differing
opinions. However, the lack of universal involvement
of all UN member states means it is not representative
and thus has no legally binding power. The evolution
of the work of this group to a UN committee would be
a slow process.
Nevertheless, the representative sample of opinions presented within the UNGGE does provide a
framework for further implementation by regional
initiatives. For now, reports issued there carry no
more than moral force.
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TALLINN MANUAL
The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare is a handbook created by a group
of international experts on how LOAC can be applicable in cyberspace. The manual is an initiative by the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to offer
guidelines to state legal advisors.30
The Tallinn Manual has posited that the general
principles of international law do apply to cyberspace,
including jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The manual’s
95 rules define: state responsibility in cyber operations, applying the principle of prohibition of the
use of force, the circumstances in which self-defense
may be invoked, the conduct of parties during cyber
hostilities, and more. The most important findings assert: “an international armed conflict exists whenever
there are hostilities, which may include or be limited
to cyber operations occurring between two states or
more,” and that “cyber operations alone might have
the potential to cross the threshold of international
armed conflict,” although such conflict triggered solely in cyberspace has not yet occurred. In the manual,
the experts confirmed that the instance of Stuxnet, a
cyberattack on Iranian nuclear facilities with kinetic
consequences, would have constituted a use of force,
but did not reach the threshold of an armed attack.
Under the manual, a cyber operation can be retaliated
against in self-defense, but only if the conditions of a
cyber armed attack (“use of force” resulting in serious
physical injury and damage) are met.31
The Tallinn Manual was drafted by a group of lawyers representing the Euro-Atlantic consensus on law
in cyberspace, and has not been widely adopted by the
international community, in part because of the lack
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of participation by nations from other regions of the
world. This applies even to France; according to JeanChristophe Noël, of the Policy Planning department
in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France is not
in agreement with the provisions of the Tallinn Manual, since there is no concept of pre-emptive defense
in French law—“the concept is too Anglo-Saxon.”
Instead, France is willing to promote the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) or the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to be
discussed further in this Letort Paper.32
Many experts agree that the development of
peacetime norms may ultimately be more important
than establishing how international law applies during armed conflict. The majority of current cyber conflicts take place far beneath the level of armed conflict,
and a lack of state practice on the actual use of force
in cyberspace creates assumptions on how to respond
without experience in actual situations.
The follow-on project, known as Tallinn 2.0, continues this reflection and focuses on the application of
international law to cyberspace in peacetime. Originally scheduled to be published in late-2016, it will
analyze the application of existing laws in the case of
cyberattacks that are below the threshold of armed
conflict, and address questions related to attribution
and possible responses.
The creation of norms is also deemed more important, as well as producing trust through confidence
building measures (CBMs). The next section of this
Letort Paper explores the existing rules and ongoing
development of norms.
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EXISTING RULES AND AGREEMENTS
Cyber Weapons.
In December 2013, signatories of the Wassenaar
Arrangements—an international regime regulating
exports of conventional weapons and sensitive dualuse items and technologies with military end-uses—
agreed to impose restrictions on exports of IP network
surveillance systems and intrusion software in order
to prevent “cyber proliferation.” Restrictions were
imposed, among others, on “zero-day” vulnerabilities
that are purchased by governments as well as other
customers for the purpose of targeted attacks.33
In July 2015, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) attempted to implement the Wassenaar Arrangements, proposing a broader set of controls than
intended in the Wassenaar text. BIS was challenged by
the cybersecurity industry that had not been properly
consulted on the specifics of such export controls.34
They argued that controls on software deemed malicious can also hurt cybersecurity research, and as a
consequence, make the Internet less safe. This is because the same offensive techniques that are developed to bypass existing computer security measures
are also used by security researchers to highlight
weaknesses in order to fix the vulnerable software. It
became clear that the BIS proposal for implementation
in effect, amounted to prohibiting the sharing of vulnerability research without a license.35 The proposal
was promptly withdrawn.
The EU is also proposing to implement the Wassenaar Arrangements, with reference to software, but
has specified in more detail which software and for
what purposes the export will be controlled.36 Taking
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into account that intrusion software and zero-day vulnerabilities can have useful and benign application,
the EU installed safeguards for research purposes,
preventing ethical hackers from being penalized. Its
drafting process has encountered less resistance from
the cybersecurity community, but it is still under scrutiny by researchers who vehemently oppose any export controls on intrusion software. The addition of
human security in the EU amendments through an EU
resolution shifts the policy focus to controlling software that is detrimental to human rights and freedom
of expression.37
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).
The development of a range of international CBMs
in various international organizations, including the
OSCE, the Organization of American States (OAS),
the SCO, and more indicates a shared perception of
threats and an affinity of threat perception. The challenge now appears to be expanding these shared
CBMs beyond regional boundaries, and beyond the
boundaries of groups of like-minded states.
CBMs are not legally binding rules, but they can
often be just as effective in maintaining security and
trust. They have practical applications, but are also
the foundation for arriving at cyber norms and fostering responsible state behavior. CBMs prevent or
reduce the risk of conflict by eliminating the causes
of mistrust and miscalculation between states—an especially complex field, given the invisible and unverifiable nature of many preparations for hostile action
in cyberspace.
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This section will provide an overview of the impressive range of CBMs that have already been implemented through the work of international organizations.
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE).
The OSCE developed a groundbreaking set of 11
voluntary CBMs that were adopted in December 2013
by its 57 member states. These were:
• Exchanging views on various aspects of national and transnational threats to and in the use of
ICTs;
• Facilitating cooperation among competent
national bodies and exchange of information;
• Consultations in order to reduce the risks of
misperception, and of possible emergence of
political or military tension or conflict;
• Sharing information on measures taken to ensure an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet;
• Using the OSCE as a platform for dialogue, exchanging best practices, awareness-raising, and
information on capacity-building;
• Putting in place modern and effective legislation to facilitate bilateral cooperation and information exchange between competent authorities;
• Sharing information on national organization,
strategies, policies, and programs relevant to
the security of, and use of, ICTs;
• Nominating a contact point to facilitate pertinent communications and dialogue;
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• Providing a list of national terminology related
to the security of, and in the use of, ICTs, accompanied by an explanation or definition of
each term;
• Exchanging views using OSCE platforms and
mechanisms to facilitate communications regarding the CBMs; and,
• Regular meetings of national experts to discuss
the information exchanged and explore appropriate development of future CBMs.
More than three-quarters of OSCE participating
states have already exchanged the specified information with other states, and the OSCE is observing and
encouraging the voluntary implementation of the
remaining CBMs. A further set of measures is being
developed, with a focus on cooperative and “stability
measures,” whereby individual states commit to refrain from taking certain actions against each other.38
The UNGGE 2015 report based its recommended
CBMs heavily on the 2013 OSCE voluntary measures,
and in return, the next set of OSCE measures will be in
line with the recommendations of the UNGGE report.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Regional Forum.
In 2012, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
ASEAN tasked the ASEAN Regional Forum with the
promotion of dialogue on confidence-building, stability, and risk-reduction measures among its members
in ensuring cybersecurity. The ASEAN Regional Forum was also mandated to develop a work plan on ICT
security, focusing on practical cooperation on CBMs.
The ASEAN Regional Forum work plan, presented in
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2015, proposes the establishment of an open-ended
study group on CBMs. The workshops and preliminary reports that have been produced in support of
that study group are reportedly also building on the
OSCE set of CBMs.
The Organization of American States (OAS).
The OAS became the first regional body to adopt a
cybersecurity strategy through approval of their resolution, “Comprehensive Inter-American Strategy to
Combat Threats to Cybersecurity,” in 2004. This strategy encompassed a number of initiatives aimed at
strengthening trust between member states. The main
objectives of the Secretariat are to establish national
“alert, watch, and warning” groups, creating a network of these Computer Security Incident Response
Teams (CSIRTs); and to promote a culture and awareness of cybersecurity.39
CBMs in the OAS context have been primarily focused on cybercrime or infrastructure-protection capacity building initiatives, with the aim of preventing
states from becoming a safe haven or permissive environment for cybercriminals. A working group of the
OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security was tasked
with the unification of the criteria for reporting confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), and
created a consolidated list in 2009.40
The implementation of these measures has been
delegated to the Inter-American Committee against
Terrorism (CICTE), the process of the Meetings of
Ministers of Justice or of Ministers or Attorneys General of the Americas (REMJA), and the Inter-American
Telecommunication Commission (CITEL).
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Bilateral and Regional Agreements.
Several other codes of norms and good behavior
have been constructed in bilateral and regional agreements.
Cybercrime: The Budapest Convention.
The 2001 European Convention on Cyber Crime
(The Budapest Convention) is the first international
treaty to address computer and Internet crime, and
was explicitly intended to increase cooperation
among nations. The Convention was drawn up by
the Council of Europe and ratified by 39 countries.
The Convention identifies certain offences against the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer
data and systems as criminal activities. Under these
offences is understood:
• Illegal access to data (when infringing security
measures);
• The interception of data and interference
(damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration
or suppression of computer data);
• Access, interception, and interference of
systems;
• Creating devices and computer programs
designed to make the above offences possible;
• Computer related fraud and forgery;
• Infringement of copyright; and,
• Offences in content, related to child
pornography.
The signatory countries of the Convention are legally obliged to prevent, investigate, and prosecute
all these actions. Through the Budapest Convention’s
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Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) provisions, cooperation has improved and effective measures against cybercrime have been undertaken.41 The advantages of
the Convention as a means to resolve conflicts through
law enforcement have been recognized outside Europe. Non-EU countries such as Australia, the Dominican Republic, Japan, Mauritius, Panama, Canada,
and the United States are also signatories.
With the possibility for accession of non-EU countries to the Convention, the Convention can still grow
to become a comprehensive international framework
for all states. Brazil, China, and India; however, have
argued that a treaty negotiated by Europe is inherently inapplicable to non-European countries, despite
the fact that non-European countries are already party
to the Convention, and a large proportion of international law that applies today stems from negotiations amongst Europeans.42 Russia in particular, has
long argued that the Budapest Convention is fatally
flawed, as its provisions on access to foreign information systems violate state sovereignty. This claim was
rejected in December 2014 by the committee that oversees the treaty.43 Russia also argues, however, that the
Convention should be replaced with “an entirely new
document with worldwide application . . . since the
Convention itself does not allow amendments.”44
The counter-argument runs that an open-ended
intergovernmental expert group already exists to conduct a comprehensive study on the problem of cybercrime, with the possibility of launching negotiations
on a new cybercrime treaty under UN auspices, but
this has so far not shown any results.45 Furthermore,
a new Treaty is unnecessary when the Budapest Convention has already been tested and approved by
many countries and can be expanded to the rest of the
world.
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European Union (EU).
The EU Cybersecurity Strategy adopted in 2014
defines norms of behavior in cyberspace that all stakeholders should adhere to, following the same principles as core EU values. It has put forward proposals
to fill legislative gaps identified in its National Infrastructure Strategy (NIS) on national capabilities, coordination in cases of incidents spanning across borders,
and private sector involvement and preparedness.
On matters of international security, the EU encourages the development of CBMs in cybersecurity
to increase transparency and reduce the risk of misperceptions in state behavior. The EU does not, however,
support the creation of new international legal instruments for cyber issues.46
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
NATO’s enhanced policy on cyber defense, endorsed by Allied defense ministers in June 2014, confirmed that international law applies in cyberspace.
Therefore, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty on
collective self-defense can be invoked in case of a cyberattack with effects comparable to those of a conventional armed attack. However, Jamie Shea, Deputy
Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security
Challenges at NATO Headquarters, has said that the
Policy does not set any detailed criteria for the activation of Article 5, which would have to be decided by
the Allies on a case-by-case basis.47
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United States-Russia.
In June 2013, the United States and Russia signed
the first bilateral agreement to reduce the risk of conflict in cyberspace through real-time communications
about incidents of national security concern.
A hotline on cyber incidents was established as
one of the components in the existing Direct Secure
Communication System between the White House
and the Kremlin. The exchange of technical information between the U.S. Computer Emergency Response
Team and its Russian counterpart is another important agreement that is the first part of a set of CBMs.48
Russia views the bilateral agreements between
itself and the United States, concluded in person by
Presidents Obama and Putin, as far more advanced
and significant than agreements with the EU, and has
gone as far as to describe the agreement as a “pact on
electronic non-aggression.”49
However, the agreement on information exchange
was welcomed by both sides as a mechanism for removing elements of suspicion or doubt, important to
improve trust that seemingly malicious activity is in
fact benign, and to increase transparency, ensuring a
full understanding of one another’s perspectives on
defense policies.
United States-China.
In September 2015, the United States and China
came to a significant bilateral agreement on cybersecurity.50 While it was not the widely anticipated cyber
arms control deal, an agreement was reached to abide
by norms of behavior in cyberspace. At the time of this
writing, these norms remain unspecified, but a senior

24

expert group is to be created in order to identify them,
basing itself on the work done by the UNGGE. This
would mean that norms set by the UNGGE could be
implemented by two major cyber players in an adversarial relationship, which would constitute major
progress toward international regulation.
The United States and China also agreed that neither country’s government would conduct or knowingly support cyber enabled theft of intellectual
property, with the intent of providing competitive
advantages to companies or commercial sectors.
The timing of the agreement was significant, and
relieved tension at a time when President Obama was
preparing to impose sanctions against Chinese companies accused of intellectual theft shortly before a visit
to the United States by Chinese President Xi Jinping.
The agreement also encompassed CBMs established through a “high-level joint dialogue mechanism on fighting cybercrime and related issues.”51
MLA would be improved, where both sides agreed
to cooperate with requests to investigate cybercrimes
and provide updates on the status and results of
those investigations, collect electronic evidence, and
mitigate malicious cyberactivity emanating from their
territory. A hotline for the escalation of issues will be
opened, which will drastically improve trust between
the two powers, providing a framework for transparency.
Practical implementation appeared to follow swiftly, when a small number of hackers were arrested in
China at the request of the U.S. Government within
the following week.52 As of yet, however, there is no
public indication that China has curtailed its cyber
espionage programs.
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This deal was also mirrored in a UK-China bilateral pact a month later,53 and could be the basis for
further bilateral agreements.
Russia-China.
In May 2015, Russia and China signed a bilateral
agreement on cooperation in the field of international
information security.
This agreement was also dubbed a non-aggression
pact, since both sides agreed to refrain from using cyberattacks against each other, protecting each other’s
internal sovereignty in cyberspace. They agreed to
respond jointly to technologies that may have a destabilizing effect on political and socio-economic life or
interfere with the internal affairs of the state.
In keeping with the title of the agreement and the
security concerns of both states, the cyberthreats defined in the treaty are not just those that would be of
concern to the EU and the United States, but they also
include broadly defined threats such as the transmission of information that could endanger the “societalpolitical and social-economic systems, and spiritual,
moral and cultural environment of states.”54
Russia and China, together with a number of Central Asian states, have also submitted a proposal on
an international code of conduct for information security, updated from an original proposal in 2011, that is
currently circulating in the UN to be voted on in the
General Assembly.55
The involvement of other states in the proposal is
indicative of the support Russia and China enjoy for
their concept of information security. Russia offers
a powerful incentive and argument to those states
that share Russia’s information security concerns and
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wish to ensure that national security is appropriately
protected against threats in the information domain.
By comparison, the West’s offering is nebulous and
idealistic, and focuses mainly on a discussion of the
benefits (many of them intangible) that the Internet
can bring. Comparisons of these two different models
provide a classic example of hard versus soft interests.
United States-European Union (EU).
Dialogue commitments have also been made between the United States and the EU, the latest being at
a security summit in March 2014. This dialogue provides a forum for strategic consultations on areas including: international cyberspace developments; promotion and protection of human rights online; and,
politico-military and international security issues,
such as norms of behavior in cyberspace, cybersecurity CBMs, and the application of existing international
law and cybersecurity capacity building in third countries.56
Internet Governance.
Global Internet governance, the regulatory model
that keeps the Internet operational, is a different topic
from norms seeking, and is enacted in different fora.
Governance depends on a multi-stakeholder model,
while norms are developed on a state-to-state basis.
The Internet is “owned” mostly by private organizations; its architecture comprises of intermediaries
such as network operators, exchange points, search
engines, hosting services, e-commerce platforms, and
social media providers,57 and it is these who contribute strongly to governance models.
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Furthermore, debate on governance models should
not be confused with discussion of legislation on what
can be done in cyberspace. Rather than hard law and
regulatory enforcement, governance is accomplished
by means of voluntary compliance with technical
standards, codes of conduct, and industry best practices. Nevertheless, the ideological dividing lines on
how the Internet should be governed mirror those in
discussions on how legislation should be made.
The Internet is mostly regulated through interconnectedness and peering agreements among Internet
service providers, with the most important international governing bodies being the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), and
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
The ITU is the UN agency for ICT and is a provider
of ITU law.58 An important political confrontation over
Internet governance came when the ITU organized
the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) in Dubai in 2012, as mentioned earlier.
The ITU was proposing new International Telecommunications Regulations (ITR) that had not been reviewed since 1988. These would have meant in effect
that the Internet would suddenly be government led,
under the regulatory framework of the ITU, and move
away from a multi-stakeholder model.59 As a result, a
group of nations concerned about Internet freedom,
and led by the United States, refused to sign the agreement on changes.60
At that point, the Internet was overseen by a loose
grouping of organizations, mostly in the private sector, rather than by governments. At least one, ICANN,
was operated under a contract from the U.S. Government. The importance of ICANN stems from the organization’s work on the coordination of the Internet
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systems of unique identifiers by coordination of IP
addresses and the DNS, a hierarchical organization of
namespace that is vital for the functioning of the Internet. This provided ammunition to those who claimed
that the Internet was in fact run by the United States,
so this arrangement was changed in 2014.
In March 2014, the U.S. Department of Commerce
announced its intent to transfer its stewardship role
over certain functions that keep the Internet running,
known collectively as the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA), to the global multi-stakeholder
community. The move was internationally applauded, as it addressed the contentious issue of U.S. control over ICANN. An important condition for the transition was that the control over IANA functions had
to be exercised in a multi-stakeholder model, rather
than a state-to-state model, and governments would
not have ultimate decision-making authority. This removed the fear that the IANA transition would lead to
a UN takeover.61 NETMundial, hosted by Brazil, was
the Global Multi-stakeholder Meeting on the Future
of Internet Governance, where an outcome document
was produced consolidating proposals for a roadmap
on future Internet governance. Representatives from
government, business, civil society, and academia
were participants (actively present and remotely present) at this first of its kind multi-stakeholder meeting.62
Despite being due in September 2015, the IANA
transition has still not occurred at the time of this writing, and administrative preparations are ongoing.63
A key argument in favor of the multi-stakeholder
model for Internet governance, and against governance exercised only by states, is that this avoids mixing geopolitics and national preferences in with governance on technical issues. As the United States argued
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in Dubai in 2012, the Internet should not be included in
a draft interstate treaty dealing with technical matters
like connecting international telephone calls, because
doing so would replace the existing, bottom-up form
of Internet oversight with a government-led model
and hence, directly threaten Internet freedoms.64
Russia takes a contrary view. While Russia has
begun to say that it supports a multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance in principle, an important caveat is that this was with specific weight allocated to individual stakeholders. In critical questions,
the state would have the right of veto, but other stakeholders would not. By contrast, Sarah Taylor, from the
UK’s Department of Culture Media and Sport, emphasized in December 2014 that a multi-stakeholder
model needs protection against any single dominating
interest. According to Jean-Jacques Sahel of ICANN,
the key phrase is “avoiding capture”; for this purpose,
the model needs to be as balanced as possible.
OUTLOOK, IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
This Letort Paper has given a brief overview of the
relevant moves toward establishing norms and the
rule of law in cyberspace. Even though the evolution
of law is slow, the cyber domain is changing fast, and
a measured approach to establishing norms is essential in order to ensure that they remain relevant in the
longer term.
Is There a Need for a New Treaty?
The current trend of bilateral and regional implementation of CBMs, norm setting, and threat defining contributes to enhanced cybersecurity. However,
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it does little to address fundamental mismatches of
cybersecurity concepts between the Euro-Atlantic
community and states such as Russia and China.
While to some extent these can be addressed by the
wide variations in interpretation of cyberthreats in the
bilateral agreements between Russia and China, versus the agreements made with Western powers, it remains the case that the conceptual divergence fosters
misapprehension and miscommunication.
In particular, the variation in interpretation of
what constitutes hostile action in cyberspace gives rise
to concern that a nation may consider itself to be in a
state of hostilities with another, while that other is as
yet unaware.65
Norms are the predecessors of an internationally
agreed rule of law regime. Without universal norms,
coming to an agreement on how to react to improper
behavior is challenging. Therefore, the development
of non-binding universal norms on appropriate behavior, governing those principles that are universally
agreed, is the first priority. The UNGGE as a consensus building organization has a key role to play in
this task.
Sovereignty and Rights.
Rules and regulations arrived at by negotiation between states can be abused by authoritarian regimes
to suppress their own populations and deprive them
of their privacy and other human rights. Setting obligations to follow international law also provides for
state supervision and jurisdiction over domestic territory that has the potential to promote the application
of sovereignty principles over the Internet. Any eventual international agreement must be drafted care-
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fully with this in mind: that asking for more control
over malicious activity may hand states the power to
oppress citizens online.
The perception by Russia, China, and like-minded
states that unrestricted flows of information and opinions—especially through social media—are a threat to
security, gives rise to continuing efforts to constrain
freedom of expression online. Their efforts to regulate
information security, and especially to persuade other
nations to support their international initiatives, are a
challenge to Internet freedoms. Broadly speaking, it
is essential to continue to resist the current efforts by
Russia, China, and others to introduce legislation that
would enforce controls on content as well as on hostile
code. However, this does not mean that it would be
impossible to arrive at specific agreements or CBMs
that apply to specific activities online that all sides
concur are unacceptable.
If it is important to the United States that freedom
on the global web be protected, the United States needs
to avoid both the fact and the appearance of constraining Internet freedom domestically. This leads to immediate challenges when attempting to counter subversive and hostile campaigns online, especially through
social media, originating from the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) and Russia. One key remedy is transparency. When action is taken to censor or suppress
content online, then having publicly visible political
oversight and review of the steps taken are essential.
“Balkanization / Splinternet.”
Allegations by Edward Snowden about the use of
mass data collection by the United States, as well as
their damage to U.S. and allied national security, has

32

also boosted the argument for sovereignty in cyberspace and the concept, embraced by Russia, China,
and others, of “national information space.”
The European Court of Justice Decision in September 2015 to end the “safe harbor” agreement sets an
important precedent in this process. The lack of trust
in U.S. companies and in the U.S. Government on the
storage of European citizens’ data has pushed European countries to end an agreement with the United
States on data storage. A German data protection
agency already called for data localization, the storage of network data, and communications within the
territory, and others will probably follow suit.66
While the decision has been presented as positive
for EU citizens, it also provides a precedent for further
Balkanization of the Internet. Sovereignty and control
over cyberspace can now legitimately be striven after
by governments with far less democratic overview.67
The move toward devolution from the global Internet is not universal. In Brazil, proposed legislation
to force all network data to be stored on Brazilian territory was dropped after heavy protests.68 Companies
like Google complained they would have to make
expensive investments in server centers on Brazilian territory, and there was a perceived danger that
other corporations would avoid business in Brazil
altogether because of the cost, inadvertently restricting online freedom even more. The measures were too
reminiscent of Brazil’s recent authoritarian past, and
were rejected.
Russia, however, has no such constraints, and
is taking the opportunity to put in place human security measures and domestic legislation aimed at
“preventing breaches in national information space.”
Data localization laws in Russia came into force on
September 1, 2015.
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Dealing with Cyber Threats.
For any arm of the U.S. Government, the current state of online legislation—and the attitudes to
it around the world—has direct implications for the
range of cyberthreats that face the United States, and
how they can be addressed.
The approach of “trust but verify,” which is the
foundation of arms-control regimes in other domains,
has virtually no applicability to cyberspace. Cyber
threats include the capabilities of nonstate actors who
are not bound by traditional diplomatic means of constraint. Meanwhile, events in Ukraine have shown
that even state actors like Russia no longer consider
themselves bound by norms of behavior that have
been taken for granted in the West for several decades.
It is commonly held among legal experts working
on the cyber domain that a catastrophic event is required in order to crystallize the law. It is only possible
to arrive at a definition of an “armed attack,” and determine for sure whether retaliation and self-defense
was justified, when such action has been taken, the
international community has reviewed those actions,
and determined if there was a breach of international
law.
In the meantime, in the current cyberthreat environment, acting based on trust alone would require a
substantial leap of faith. There appears at present to be
no substitute for additional insurance in the form of
unarguably strong cyber capabilities, both defensive
and offensive.
The Tallinn Manual and the UNGGE consensus
provide models for the application of international
law to actions in cyberspace. However, it is vital to
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remember that although they may be attractive to the
United States and its allies, they are not agreed upon
by the entire international community and hence they
should not be considered in any way binding on current or potential adversaries, either state or especially
nonstate.
The approaches of key potential state adversaries
to legitimation or prohibition of online activity provides important clues to how they see this activity in
terms of their own behaviors. The widely varying attitudes displayed toward what is and is not legal and
constrained in online behavior leads to a final vital
point for the United States: That adversaries are framing their cyber offensive potential in an entirely different mental construct to that which applies in the
United States and its Western allies. As demonstrated
in Ukraine, the threat from Russia is an integrated one
encompassing the whole of the information domain,
as opposed to strictly technical interpretations of what
constitutes cyber activity. It follows that considerable
mental agility will continue to be required in order to
plan for, counter, and respond to the very wide range
of threats to U.S. security that state and nonstate adversaries can present using the Internet.
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представлении зарубежных государств” (“Distorting Mirror:
Russian Information Security Interests As Viewed By Foreign
States”), Seventh International Forum, “Partnership of State Authorities, Civil Society and the Business Community in Ensuring
International Information Security,” Moscow State University,
April 2013, pp. 228-237.
25. United Nations (UN) General Assembly, 58th Session,
“Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security: Report of the Secretary-General,” A/58/373, September 17, 2003.

38

26. UN General Assembly, 68th Session, “Report of the Group
of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security,” A/68/98, June 24, 2013.
27. UN General Assembly, 70th Session, “Report of the Group
of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security,” A/70/174, July 22, 2015.
28. Joseph Marks, “U.N. body agrees to U.S. norms in cyberspace,” Politico, July 9, 2015, available from www.politico.com/story/2015/07/un-body-agrees-to-us-norms-in-cyberspace-119900.
29. Eneken Tikk-Ringas and Mika Kerttunen, “The Great
Game of Cyber Norms,” publication forthcoming.
30. For full text and background, see “Tallinn Manual Process,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Cooperative
Cyber Defence (CCD) Centre of Excellence (COE) website, available from https://ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual.html.
31. Michael N. Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual on the International
Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013, available from https://issuu.com/nato_ccd_coe/docs/
tallinnmanual/7?e=0/1803379.
32. Speaking at the 13th International Information Security
Research Consortium, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Munich, Germany, April 2014.
33. “The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and
Munitions List,” December 4, 2013, available from www.wassenaar.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Previous/2013_OK/WA-LIST%20
%2813%29%201.pdf.
34. Nate Cardozo and Eva Galperin, “What Is the U.S. Doing About Wassenaar, and Why Do We Need to Fight It?” Electronic Frontier Foundation, May 28, 2015, available from https://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/we-must-fight-proposed-us-wassenaarimplementation.

39

35. Ibid.
36. See Section 5A2 Systems, Equipment and Components, in
“ANNEXES to the Commission Delegated Regulation amending
Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up a Community
regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit
of dual use items,” Brussels: The European Commission, October
12, 2015, available from trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/october/
tradoc_153894.pdf.
37. European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Marietje Schaake, Rapporteur, “Report on ‘Human rights
and technology: the impact of intrusion and surveillance systems on human rights in third countries’,” June 3, 2015, available from www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2015-0178+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
38. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), “Panel 2: Avoiding Dissonance: A Round Table on Future Inter-Regional Collaboration,” presentation at UN Institute
for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), “Cyber Stability 2015 ‘Regime Coherence’,” Geneva, Switzerland, July 9, 2015, available
from www.unidir.ch/files/conferences/pdfs/-en-1-1033.pdf.
39. Organization of American States (OAS), “Comprehensive
Inter-American Strategy to Combat Threats to Cybersecurity: A
Multidimensional and Multidisciplinary Approach to Creating
a Culture of Cybersecurity,” AG/RES. 2004 (XXXIV-O/04), adopted at the fourth plenary session, June 8, 2004, available from
www.oas.org/XXXIVGA/english/docs/approved_documents/adoption_
strategy_combat_threats_cybersecurity.htm.
40. Permanent Council of the OAS, Committee on Hemispheric Security, “List of confidence- and security-building measures,” OAS website, January 15, 2009, available from www.oas.
org/csh/english/csbmlist.asp#Santiago.
41. COE, Details of Treaty No. 185, “Convention on Cybercrime,” Treaty open for signatures in Budapest, November
23, 2001, available from conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/
Html/185.htm.

40

42. Alex Grigsby, “Coming Soon: Another Country to Ratify
the Budapest Convention,” Net Politics, Council on Foreign Relations, blog entry, posted December 11, 2014, available from blogs.
cfr.org/cyber/2014/12/11/coming-soon-another-country-to-ratify-tothe-budapest-convention/.
43. Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY), “T-CY Guidance Note # 3: Transborder Access to Data (Article 32),” Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, December 3, 2014, available
from
www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/Source/Cybercrime/TCY/2014/T-CY(2013)7REV_GN3_transborder_V12adopted.
pdf.
44. Sergey Mikhailovich Boyko, speaking at the International
Information Security Research Consortium, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Munich, Germany, April 2014.
45. UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Intergovernmental expert group to conduct a comprehensive study of the
problem of cybercrime to take place from 25 to 28 February 2013
in Vienna, Austria,” UNODC News and Events webpage, January
18, 2013, available from https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organizedcrime/news/2013/cybercrime-study-expert-group-feb.html.
46. High Representative of the European Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission, Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure
Cyberspace, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions, Brussels: European Commission, July
2, 2013.
47. “NATO Summit Updates Cyber Defence Policy,” NATO
CCD COE International Cyber Developments Review (INCYDER) Database, October 24, 2014, available from https://ccdcoe.org/
nato-summit-updates-cyber-defence-policy.html.
48. Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: U.S.-Russian
Cooperation on Information and Communications Technology
Security,” Washington, DC: The White House, June 17, 2013, available from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/
fact-sheet-us-russian-cooperation-information-and-communicationstechnol.
41

49. Special Representative of the President of the Russian
Federation on International Cooperation on Information Security,
Ambassador at Large Andrey Krutskikh, speaking at the International Information Security Research Consortium, GarmischPartenkirchen, Germany, April 2014.
50. Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: President Xi
Jinping’s State Visit to the United States,” Washington, DC: The
White House, September 25, 2015, available from https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states.
51. Ibid.
52. Ellen Nakashima and Adam Goldman, “In a first, Chinese
hackers are arrested at the behest of the U.S. government,” The
Washington Post, October 9, 2015, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-a-first-chinese-hackers-arearrested-at-the-behest-of-the-us-government/2015/10/09/0a7b0e466778-11e5-8325-a42b5a459b1e_story.html.
53. Rowena Mason, “Xi Jinping state visit: UK and China sign
cybersecurity pact,” The Guardian, October 21, 2015, available
from www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/oct/21/uk-china-cybersecurity-pact-xi-jinping-david-cameron.
54. See also: Russian analysis of this agreement: Elena Chernenko, “Будем дружить доменами” (“We Will Be Friends In Domains”), Kommersant, No. 79, May 7, 2014, available from kommersant.ru/doc/2723155.
55. “Annex to the Letter dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General,” International code of conduct
for information security, Presented to the 69th Session of the UN
General Assembly, January 13, 2015, available from https://ccdcoe.
org/sites/default/files/documents/UN-150113-CodeOfConduct.pdf.
56. “FACT SHEET: EU-US cooperation on cyber security
and cyberspace,” Brussels: European External Action Service,
March 26, 2014, available from www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/
docs/2014/140326_01_en.pdf.
42

57. The Global Commission on Internet Governance, About
webpage, available from https://www.ourinternet.org/about.
58. Alexander Klimburg, ed., National Cyber Security Framework Manual, Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCD COE Publications,
2012.
59. Eric Pfanner, “U.S. Rejects Telecommunications Treaty,”
The New York Times, December 13, 2012, available from www.nytimes.com/2012/12/14/technology/14iht-treaty14.html?_r=0.
60. “Conference concludes in Dubai with 89 countries having signed the updated International Telecommunication Regulations,” WCIT2012 Hightlights, Iss. No. 6, December 13-14, 2012,
available from www.itu.int/osg/wcit-12/highlights/dec13-14.html#.
VjWcDYR6nR1.
61. Alex Grigsby, “The Top Five Cyber Policy Developments of 2014: The IANA Transition,” Net Politics, Council on
Foreign Relations, January 6, 2015, available from blogs.cfr.org/
cyber/2015/01/06/the-top-five-cyber-policy-developments-of-2014-theiana-transition/.
62. “NETmundial: the beginning of a process,” About webpage for the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of
Internet Governance, São Paulo, Brazil, April 23-24, 2014, available from netmundial.br/about/.
63. Arun Mohan Sukumar, “Governments v. ICANN: The
Last Battle Before the IANA Transition,” Net Politics, Council on
Foreign Relations, October 27, 2015, available from blogs.cfr.org/
cyber/2015/10/27/governments-v-icann-the-last-battle-before-the-ianatransition/.
64. Pfanner, “U.S. Rejects Telecommunications Treaty.”
65. Explored in more detail in Giles, Legality in Cyberspace.
66. Matthias Bauer, “EU-US Safe Harbour and forced data
localisation: lessons from Russia,” EurActiv, October 18, 2015,
available from www.euractiv.com/sections/digital/eu-us-safe-harbourand-forced-data-localisation-lessons-russia-318606.

43

67. For a detailed view on this process from Russia, arguing that de facto “Balkanization” without a political declaration
is already under way in many countries, see Aleksandra Kulikova, “Фрагментация интернета: о чем мы говорим и куда
все движется?” (“Fragmentation of the Internet: What Are We
Talking About and Where Is It All Going?”), PIR-Center, October 22, 2014, available from http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/
files/12/14140075130.pdf.
68. Anthony Boadle, “Brazil to drop local data storage rule in
Internet bill,” Reuters, March 18, 2014, available from www.reuters.
com/article/2014/03/19/us-brazil-internet-idUSBREA2I03O20140319.

44

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General William E. Rapp
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
and
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS
Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Steven K. Metz
Author
Mr. Keir Giles
Editor for Production
Dr. James G. Pierce
Publications Assistant
Ms. Denise J. Kersting
*****
Composition
Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

